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1961] RECENT DECISIONS 218 
ANTITRUST LAW- EXEMPTIONS FOR REGULATED INDUSTRIES -APPUCA• 
BILITY OF THE ANTITRUST LAws To STOCK ExCHANGES-Defendant, the New 
York Stock Exchange, directed its members to discontinue their direct 
private wire connections with plaintiffs who were non-member brokers.1 
1 The defendant relied on Article m, § 6 of the NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE CoNm• 
TUTION, which provides that the Board of Governors of the Exchange "shall have 
supervision over all matters relating to the collection, dissemination and use of questions 
and of reports of prices on the Exchange and shall have power to approve or disapprove 
any application for ticker service to any non-member, or any wire, wireless or other 
connection between any office of the Exchange, member firm and any non-member, and 
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These private wire connections were utilized primarily for facilitating 
transactions in the over-the-counter market.2 Repeated requests by plain-
tiffs for reinstatement were ignored, and the defendant refused to apprise 
the plaintiffs of the reasons for its action. Plaintiffs then brought suit, 
seeking damages and injunctive relief pursuant to sections 4 and 16 of 
the Clayton Act.3 Maintaining that defendant's conduct violated section 1 
of the Sherman Act,4 plaintiffs moved for summary judgment.5 Held, 
motion granted.6 Defendant does not enjoy an exemption from the anti-
trust laws. The conduct of it and its members constituted a concerted 
refusal to deal, which is a per se violation of the Sherman Act.7 Silver v. 
New York Stock Exchange, 196 F. Supp. 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). 
This appears to be the first time that a stock exchange has been held 
liable under the antitrust laws,8 although the problem of the applicability 
of these laws to the so-called regulated industries is not a new question. 
The cases reveal that the fact of governmental regulation, no matter how 
comprehensive, is insufficient to free the members of that industry from 
the application of the antitrust laws9 unless Congress has provided an 
express statutory exemption.10 Several such exemptions have been created 
in areas where Congress has decided that free competition can be harmful 
may require the discontinuance of any such service or connection." NEW YORK STOCK 
EXCHANGE: CONSTITUTION AND RULES 1056 (CCH Reprint 1960) • See also rules 355 (e) , 
356, id. at 3611. 
2 "Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the over-the-counter markets are 
deemed to include all transactions in securities which take place otherwise than upon a 
national securities exchange." H.R. REP. No. 2307, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1938); S. REP. 
No. 1455, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1938) • 
3 38 Stat. 730, 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (1958). 
4 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958). 
5 FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (a), (c) . 
6 The motion was granted only as to defendant's conduct in ordering withdrawal of 
the private wire connections. The court did not pass on the legality of defendant's 
action in cutting off the stock ticker service to plaintiffs, and the question of whether 
defendant and its members constitute a single trader, thereby relieving them of liability 
for a conspiracy under the "single trader" doctrine was reserved for argument at the 
trial. Principal case at 228-29. 
7 The court reaffirms the view that "group action coercing outside parties is deemed 
an undue restraint of trade and, whatever its purpose, is likely to fall as unreasonable 
per se." ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST REP. 133 (1955). For a discussion of the 
law of refusals to deal, see Handler, Recent Developments in Antitrust Law: 1958-1959, 
59 CoLUM. L. REv. 843, 862 (1959) ; Oppenheim, Selected Antitrust Developments, 17 
A.B.A. REP. 45-56 (1960) ; 57 MICH. L. REv. 1244 (1959) . 
s N.Y. Times, May 22, 1961, p. 1, col. 5. See Westwood &: Howard, Self-Government 
in the Securities Business, 17 LAw &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 518, 519 (1952). 
9 See McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67 (1944); United States v. 
Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939); 101 U. PA. L. REv. 678 (1953). 
10 See Pennsylvania Water &: Power Co. v. Consolidated Gas, Elec. Light &: Power 
Co., 184 F.2d 552, 560 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 906 (1950). See also Note, 64 
HARV. L. REv. 1154 (1951); Note, 28 IND. L.J. 194 (1953). 
1961] RECENT DECISIONS 215 
to the general public or detrimental to the industry itself.11 They some-
times encompass all matters subject to the jurisdiction of a particular 
regulatory agency,12 but more commonly the exceptions relate to specified 
activities which require initial agency approval in each individual case.13 
The general purpose of Congress in enacting the Securities Exchange 
Act of 193414 was to facilitate an orderly securities business through the co-
operative efforts of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the ex-
changes in the listed securities market,15 and the SEC and the dealers 
themselves in the over-the-counter market.16 To effectuate that part of 
the plan dealing with listed securities, the stock exchanges were empowered 
to promulgate rules and regulations governing the use of their facilities 
and the conduct of their members.17 However, an exchange's activity pur-
suant to any rule or regulation adopted under this power must comply 
with the antitrust laws since the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 contains 
no express exemption for an organized stock exchange;18 and the courts 
have been unwilling to recognize any implied exemptions.19 The holding 
of the principal case is further strengthened by the fact that while the 
exchanges are authorized to police their members in the listed securities 
market, the conduct of defendant and its members amounted to a disciplin-
ing of a non-member in the over-the-counter market. Although defendant's 
11 Problems often arise concerning the scope of such exemptions. See, e.g., Maryland 
&: Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458 (1960). 
12 E.g., § 16 of the Clayton Act expressly precludes private parties from bringing 
antitrust actions to enjoin "any matter subject to the regulation, supervision, or other 
jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission." 38 Stat. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 26 (1958). 
13 E.g., the Federal Maritime Board may approve and thus exempt agreements be-
tween carriers fixing rates or "controlling, regulating, preventing or destroying competi-
tion," 39 Stat. 733 (1916), 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1958) ; the Federal Communications Com-
mission may approve telegraph mergers which then "shall be lawful," 57 Stat. 5 (1943) , 
47 U.S.C. § 222 (b) (1) (1958). See generally H.R. Doc. No. 599, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 
29 (1950). 
14 48 Stat. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1958) . 
15 "It is hoped that the effect of the bill will be to give to the well-managed ex-
changes that power necessary to enable them to effect themselves needed reforms and 
that the occasion for direct action by the Commission will not arise." H.R. REP. No. 
1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1934). See also Avery v. Moffatt, 187 Misc. 576, 592, 55 
N.Y.S.2d 215 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1945). 
16 S. REP. No. 1455, 75th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 4 (1938); H.R. REP. No. 2307, 75th Cong., 
3d Sess. 4, 5 (1938). See generally Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 762 (1951). 
17 48 Stat. 885 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78 (f) (1958). 
18 The defendant concedes that there is neither an express exemption nor an implied 
over-all blanket exemption under the act. Principal case at 217. 
10 See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), where 
Medina, J. stated: "It must be borne in mind that this whole statutory scheme was 
worked out with the greatest care by members of the Congress thoroughly aware of anti-
trust problems •••• They intended no exemption to the Sherman Act; and it is hardly 
probable that they would inadvertently accomplish such a result." 
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rules included provisions empowering it to take the action it did,20 de-
fendant could not extend its supervisory powers beyond those contemplated 
by Congress merely because those rules were accepted by the SEC without 
protest. Moreover, non-members are not afforded the same procedural 
safeguards for processing grievances which the exchange guarantees to its 
members;21 thus, coupled with the defendant's seemingly unjustifiable 
action was the notable reluctance of the court to strip the plaintiffs of 
all right to redress before a judicial body.22 
Although the decision in the principal case appears sound, it reveals 
potential difficulties arising from the fact that stock exchanges, even 
though they have not been granted an express exemption, have been vested 
with the responsibility of policing all transactions in listed securities. Illus-
tratively, if plaintiffs had dealt with the exchange's members only in listed 
securities and if the exchange, upon learning of deceptive practices on the 
part of the plaintiffs~ ordered its members to discontinue private wire 
connections with the plaintiffs, it would appear that defendant's order 
could not be carried out without subjecting it to a suit for an antitrust 
violation. This strange result seems to follow from the holding of the 
principal case that there are no exemptions from the antitrust laws for an 
organized stock exchange, and that all concerted refusals to deal with an 
outside party are condemned as being per se violations of the Sherman 
Act. The congressional policy favoring competition thus comes into direct 
conflict with the congressional desire to have effective securities regulation. 
Although there is no legislative indication as to which policy should pre-
vail in situations similar to the one suggested, it appears that in such cases 
it will be necessary to subordinate the policy of competition in order to 
enable the exchanges to regulate successfully the listed securities market.28 
Whether this subordination should be achieved by legislative action, by 
judicial creation of either a limited implied exemption from the antitrust 
laws or a limited exception to the per se illegality doctrine of concerted 
refusals to deal, or by some other means, is arguable; that it should be 
achieved, however, is clear. 
Peter D. Byrnes, S.Ed. 
20 Rules 355 (e) , 356, NEW YoRK STOCK ExCHANGE: CONSTITUTION AND RULES 3611 
(CCH Reprint 1960) • 
21 NEW YoRK STOCK EXCHANGE CONSTITUTION, art. XXIV, § 14, id. at 1089. Such 
procedural safeguards are especially necessary in view of the monopoly position held by 
the exchange with respect to the trading of listed securities. 
22 This latter position was founded on the somewhat doubtful proposition that there 
was no possibility of plaintiffs airing their grievances before the SEC. The mere fact 
that no statutory procedure had been established would not automatically bar the 
plaintiffs from a hearing before the SEC. 
23 There is also a need for more affirmative regulation by the SEC in order to close 
the gap that exists between the regulation of the listed securities business by the ex-
changes and the regulation of the over-the-counter business by the SEC. The close 
interrelationship of these two markets calls for coextensive as well as separate regulation. 
